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INTRODUCTION
The role of the United Kingdom’s Territorial Waters Officer (TWO) is both 
varied and absorbing and, for those Royal Naval Hydrographic Surveyors lucky 
enough to be appointed to the post, the fascinating world of international maritime 
law and maritime zones and boundary delineation is opened, albeit by just a frac­
tion.
The paper deals briefly with the historical role of the Hydrographer, in 
maritime zone issues prior to the establishment of the TWO post in 1917, and 
continuing to the Second World war. The three decades following World War If 
are then discussed including the increasing internationalization of TWO’s work and 
finally the task today covering the varied type of assistance and advice given, the 
present state of the delimitation of the UK’s continental shelf highlighting the most 
recent developments and the impact of the 12-nm territorial sea limit.
BRIEF HISTORY — PRE-1945
The traditional role of the Royal Naval Hydrographic Surveyor was the 
surveying and depiction of the coastal waters around the United Kingdom and her 
colonies for the British Navy. This commitment is still fundamentally the same 
today.
(*) Territorial Waters Officer, Royal Navy, Hydrographic Department, Taunton, Somerset TÀ1 2DN, UK.
It is evident that advice on ‘maritime zones’ was offered from as early as 
1864. Vice Admiral Sir Archibald D a y  states in his book ‘The Admiralty Hydro- 
graphic Service 1795-1919’ that the Hydrographer at that time, Rear Admiral 
G.H. R ic h a r d s , CB, FRS, remarked on a Foreign Office Reference, ‘the diffi­
culties of interpreting the international rules on territorial waters’. He suggested 
that one league might be altered to two under the then altered conditions of 
projectiles of war, and he mentioned the historic use of King’s Chambers for 
estuaries or bays [Ref. 1], These are early references to the cannon shot rule for 
territorial sea limits and an early indication to bay closing lines.
This early advice was obviously not accepted because the Territorial Waters 
Jurisdiction Act 1878 [Ref. 2] still referred to ‘any part of the open sea within 
one marine league of the coast measured from the low water mark shall be 
deemed to be open sea within the territorial waters of Her Majesty’s dominion’. 
This Act brought into focus the importance of the drying line (low water mark) in 
the determination of the UK’s territorial water limits.
Some difficulties arose in the early twentieth century when the Norwegians 
and Danes claimed four-mile territorial sea limits. Hydrographer continued to 
advise the Foreign Office and Colonial Office on matters of sovereignty, parti­
cularly in the Antarctic and Pacific.
Towards the end of the First World War the business and organisation of 
the Hydrographic Department was fully set out in September 1917. Under ‘busi­
ness’ there was a section on ‘Territorial Waters and Rights’ appearing for the first 
time as a separate entity reflecting the growing demand for Hydrographer’s 
advice in this area. The result of this report was the formation of the post of 
Territorial Waters Officer and Personal Assistant to the Hydrographer the first 
incumbent being Lt. Cmdr. R . l . G o u l d , RN [Ref. 3].
From this period to the end of the Second World War, the Territorial 
Waters Officer was dealing mainly with matters concerning the breadth of the 
territorial sea, fishing rights both within the territorial sea belt and up to 12 nm 
from the baselines, and the definitions of ‘territorial sea limits’ which appear to 
have covered rivers, estuaries and bays and whether there was any justification in 
enclosing them within the baseline by drawing closing lines greater than 6 nm or 
later 10 nm. These rules were primarily concerned with exclusive fishing rights 
and throughout the period difficulties were found with the Norwegian claim to a
4 nm territorial sea limit and more particularly the baselines from which it was 
drawn.
Work of a technical nature, was also undertaken on behalf of the Foreign 
Office and Colonial Office in the lead up to the 1930 The Hague Conference. 
The Assembly of the League of Nations requested the League Council to con­
vene a committee of experts that would carefully determine those rubrics of inter­
national law which should be considered for codification [Ref. 4], A sub­
committee was formed in 1925 to deal with the territorial sea and directed ‘to 
examine whether there are problems connected with the law of the territorial sea 
... which might find their solution by way of conventions ...’. Although the United 
Kingdom was not represented on this committee, its work was closely followed in 
this country and some regret was expressed that no agreement on the extent of 
the territorial sea had been reached by the sub committee. Further work continued
leading to the Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations’ Resolution of 22 Septem­
ber 1924, up to the formation of the Preparatory Committee in 1928 and a 
‘Schedule of Points’ was circulated to Governments requesting comments. Point 
III requested each State’s view on the ‘breadth of territorial waters subject to the 
Sovereignty of the State (three miles, six miles, range of cannon, etc.)’ and its 
claims, if any, to jurisdiction beyond territorial waters [Ref. 5].
The actual conference assembled at The Hague in March 1930. The Terri­
torial Waters Officer, Lieutenant Commander R.M. SOUTHERN, RN (later to be 
promoted Captain) was a member of the UK delegation as a technical expert and 
a considerable amount of work would have been undertaken in support. In terri­
torial waters matters, the British position was stated very clearly by the leader of 
the delegation, Sir Maurice G w y e r  as follows:
‘The British Delegation firmly supports Basis No. 3 that is to say, a terri­
torial belt of three miles without the exercise, as of right, of any powers by 
the Coastal State in the contiguous zone, and they do that on three 
grounds. First, because in their view the three mile limit is a rule of 
international law already existing adopted by maritime nations which possess 
nearly 80% of the effective tonnage of the world; secondly, because we have 
already, in this committee, adopted the principle of sovereignty over 
territorial waters; and thirdly, because the three-mile limit is the limit which 
is most in favour of freedom of navigation [Ref. 6].
Many publicists regarded the conference as disappointing; for example 
S w a r z t r a u b e r  states ‘The utter failure of the conference surprised many of the 
participants’ [Ref. 7]. I think it is true to say that the conference did not produce 
the desired results, but it did air many international maritime matters in a confe­
rence forum for the first time and did achieve some positive advances in this field 
if only to concentrate the minds of national experts on such matters as territorial 
sea limits and the concept of the contiguous zone.
The period leading up to the Second World War continued to see deve­
lopments from The Hague conference and several states declared contiguous 
zones of varying breadths. The UK continued to maintain its traditional stance 
and as war approached was more concerned with neutrality and security zones 
than the more mundane law of the sea questions.
The Hydrographic Department, including the Territorial Waters Officer, was 
fully stretched during the war, but nevertheless the first continental shelf boundary 
agreement was ratified on 22 September 1942 between the UK and Venezuela 
dividing the submarine areas between Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela in the 
Gulf of Paria [Ref. 8],
1945-1982
Since the war, nine senior Hydrographic Surveyors have held the post of 
Territorial Waters Officer, including the author. However, two stand out for their 
outstanding contributions in the technical field of boundary delimitation and the
rapidly developing areas of maritime zones in general. Commander 
R .H . K e n n e d y , OBE, RN, served in the post from 1948 to 1961 and 
Commander P .B .  B e a z l e y , OBE, FRICS, RN, from 1963 to 1983.
The entire period saw intense activity for the incumbent TWO starting with 
the Anglo/Norwegian Fisheries Case [Ref. 9], which the UK submitted to the 
International Court in 1949 after a protracted dispute lasting since the turn of the 
century. The case and its outcome are well known and many publicists have 
commented upon the court’s findings [Ref. 10, 11].
Commander K e n n e d y  was an expert adviser for the UK during the period 
and was required to produce special charts and diagrams to help present the UK 
case. Similarly detailed analysis of the basepoints used in the Norwegian Royal 
Decree of 12 July 1935 were required.
Following the case accepting the Norwegian claim for straight baselines 
north of 66°28'N, Commander K e n n e d y  wrote a note to Mr. D.H.N. J o h n s o n , an 
Assistant Legal Adviser in the Foreign Office, listing some 10 technical points, 
which he considered were factually wrong in the court’s judgement. He was a 
disappointed man to put it mildly to the point that he considered the verdict to 
have been in Norway’s favour and the judgement then written around it.
The next few years were largely taken up by preparations for the forth­
coming Geneva Conventions on the law of the sea. New questions regarding the 
judgement of the UK/Norwegian case and the use of straight baselines had to be 
addressed and the Territorial Waters Officer was involved in several studies on 
the feasibility of similar systems being employed in UK waters. Thought had been 
given to the UK’s response to the International Law Commission’s Report on the 
numerous subjects to be raised during the forthcoming Conventions, covering a 
far larger range of subjects than had been discussed during The Hague Conven­
tion nearly three decades earlier.
The actual Convention was quite short, lasting only about two months from 
24 February to 29 April 1958, but the final outcome of four Conventions opened 
for signature in Geneva was a considerable advance on The Hague Conference.
Once again Commander K e n n e d y  was a member of the UK’s delegation at 
this conference and played a key role in the many and varied technical issues 
that were discussed. The final outcome of four Conventions, namely the Terri­
torial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the High Seas, Fishing and Conservation of 
the Living Resources of the High Seas and the Continental Shelf, were considered 
acceptable by the United Kingdom and the Conventions and Optional Protocol 
were duly signed on 9 Sepember 1958. This enabled the Foreign Secretary to lay 
a favourable report of the Conference [Ref. 12] before Parliament detailing the 
salient points of prime importance to the United Kingdom and recommending its 
ratification. The Conventions were ratified on 14 March 1960 and came into 
force in the United Kingdom on 10 September 1964.
For the Territorial Waters Officer, the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone 
Convention had the greatest significance. It is a pity that the issue of the breadth 
of the territorial sea could not be resolved. The United Kingdom Delegation’s 
proposal for a 6-nm territorial waters limit with certain reservations in favour of 
innocent passage, particularly for aircraft in the 3-nm to 6-nm belt, was with­
drawn in favour of a United States proposal for a 6-nm territorial sea limit with a 
further 6-nm zone in which the coastal State would have exclusive fishing rights, 
subject to the right of other States to fish in the outer zone without limit of time if 
they had fished there during the last five years. Several other States had sugges­
ted a 12-nm territorial sea limit. Other ideas were also put forward, but even the 
closest to success, the United States proposal, failed to gain the necessary two 
thirds majority in Plenary. So the limit, as far as the United Kingdom was 
concerned, remained at 3 nm. Indeed the UK Delegation made a statement at 
the end of the Conference that Her Majesty’s Government would continue to 
regard the three mile limit as the only breadth recognised under international law, 
a situation which was to remain in place for many years.
The normal rule of using the low water line as the baseline for the measu­
rement of the breadth of the territorial sea was maintained, however, provision 
was made for the introduction of straight baselines in certain circumstances follow­
ing the court judgement in the Anglo/Norwegian case and a detailed study by the 
International Law Commission. Unfortunately, the United Kingdom’s proposal that 
each leg of the straight baseline system should not exceed 10 nm was not 
accepted and even the revised limit of 15 nm, put forward by the Committe, 
failed to gain the necessary two thirds majority in a separate vote during the 
Plenary Session. This meant that although straight baselines could be used if the 
coastal configuration met the special circumstances contained in Article 4 of the 
Convention, no limit on length was imposed. This has caused much debate and 
argument and indeed continues to this day.
The question of bays was covered by Article 7 in the Convention and was 
of particular importance to the UK, because of the configuration of its coastline 
and the preponderance of judicial bays. Several technical resolutions were put 
forward, both by the International Law Committee and delegations at the Confe­
rence itself. Two important matters were resolved. The semi-circle rule was adop­
ted for determining whether a geographical bay met the requirements of a judicial 
bay and therefore could be enclosed with a bay closing line, and secondly a limit 
of 24 nm was set for these closing lines. One point that was not agreed upon 
was a technical definition of what constitutes a natural entrance point to a bay. 
Commander KENNEDY gave a great deal of thought to the semi-circle rule, first 
envisaged by the American Delegation to The Hague Codification Conference of 
1930, and it was indeed he who suggested its adoption, in a more simplified 
form, at the Conference.
Another subject, covered by this Convention, was the question of innocent 
passage, and it was gratifying to note that the traditional right of all vessels to 
conduct innocent passage through a coastal State’s territorial sea was upheld after 
some lively debate. Another principle of great importance to the UK which was 
confirmed was that no coastal State could suspend innocent passage through 
straits which are used for international navigation between one part of the high 
seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial seas of a foreign State.
The Convention on the Continental Shelf was also important for the Terri­
torial Waters Officer, particularly Article 6 dealing with delimitation. Commander 
K e n n e d y  stated the UK’s position as follows [Ref. 13]:
1. Mr, K ennedy (United Kingdom) said that sea boundaries established 
by projection of a parallel of latitude or meridian, or by intersection of the 
radii of two fixed points on the coastlines of States which were adjacent or 
opposite to each other were not satisfactory in many cases; such boundaries 
often did not result in a fair apportionment of the sea area between the two 
States concerned, and might indeed, cut across land territory. Similarly, the 
line of deepest water was not, he thought, a satisfactory criteria for esta­
blishing a boundary; in the presence of a number of pools of varying depth 
it would be difficult to establish the exact position of such a line.
2. The fairest method of establishing a sea boundary was that of the 
median line every point of which was equidistant from the nearest points of 
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea was measured, as 
stated in the United Kingdom proposal (A/CONF.13/C.4L.28).
This proposal was as follows:
1. Where the submarine areas referred to in Article 67 are adjacent to 
the territory of two or more States whose coasts are opposite to each other, 
the boundary of such areas appertaining to such States shall, in the absence 
of agreement on any other boundary, be the median line of every point of 
which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from which the 
breadth of the territorial sea is measured.’
A similar formula was advanced for adjacent States. The main point was to 
omit the International Law Commission’s proposed reference to ‘special circums­
tances’. Commander K e n n e d y ’s statement explained the proposal as follows:
‘When properly drawn, the median line was a precise line consisting of a 
series of short straight lines. In agreeing upon a boundary, adjacent or 
opposite States might well decide to straighten that series of lines so as to 
avoid an excessive number of angles, giving an equal area to each State 
and also taking into account any special circumstances. Among the special 
circumstances which might exist there was, for example the presence of a 
small or large island in the area to be apportioned; he suggested that, for 
the purposes of drawing a boundary, islands should be treated on their 
merits, very small islands and sand cays on a continuous continental shelf 
and outside the belts of territorial sea being neglected as base points for 
measurement and having only their own appropriate territorial sea. Other 
types of special circumstances were the possession by one of the two States 
concerned of special mineral exploitation rights or fishery rights, or the 
presence of a navigable channel; in all such cases, a deviation from the 
median line would be justified, but the median line would still provide the 
best starting point for negotiations.’
Commander K e n n e d y  prepared a brief entitled ‘Brief Remarks on Median 
Lines and Lines of Equidistance and on the Methods Used in their Construction’, 
in support of the UK’s position, which was distributed to all delegates. However 
this formula was criticized until the restoration of the reference to ‘special circums­
tances’, and the resulting Article 6 in the Convention accepted the original 
elements of (i) agreement; (11) equidistance unless there are (iii) special circums­
tances.
The other two Conventions were equally important to the United Kingdom, 
but had less immediate impact on the work of the Territorial Waters Officer.
Following the signing of the four Conventions and the Optional Protocol by 
the United Kingdom, work began immediately on redefining the baseline to bring 
it into line with the new provisions set out in the Convention on the Territorial sea 
and the Contiguous Zone. This necessitated the re-drawing of several bay closing 
lines, which had previously been restricted to 10 nm and could now be drawn out 
to a maximum of 24 nm. Work was also put in hand on drawing a straight 
baseline system around the west coast of Scotland. The four Geneva Conventions 
were ratified in October 1964 and, very shortly afterwards, the United Kingdom 
issued the Territorial Waters Order in Council 1964 [Ref. 14]. This Order rede­
fined the United Kingdom’s baseline in accordance with the provisions laid down 
in the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and put in 
places straight baseline system from the Mull of Kintyre around the Outer 
Hebrides to Cape Wrath in western Scotland.
Also during 1964, the Continental Shelf Act [Ref. 15] was passed, provi­
ding enabling legislation for the exploration and exploitation of the continental 
shelf. This heralded a new departure for the Territorial Waters Officer, with 
matters concerning exploitation and exploration coming under his expert eye. 
Designated areas and licensing blocks had to be determined with some accuracy, 
particularly as the North Sea hydrocarbon bonanza was beginning. The natural 
progression of this activity was of course the Continental Shelf Boundaries in the 
North Sea.
The first UK boundary agreement in the North Sea was concluded with 
Norway in March 1965 [Ref. 16] (see Fig. 1). The bilateral negotiations had 
only taken about twelve months. Peter B e a z l e y  had taken up the appointment of 
Territorial Waters Officer by this time, and was a member of the small UK 
negotiating team. The agreement was important in that it became the model for 
subsequent UK boundaries in the North Sea. Equidistance was still the prime 
principle for delimitation at this time and this agreement was no different. It was 
agreed at a very early stage that the northern limit of the boundary would 
terminate at or near the 100 fathom isobath, and the Norwegian Trench would 
be ignored. This latter point caused a few eyebrows to be raised in the United 
Kingdom, but was based on the principles of the 1958 Geneva Convention on 
the Continental Shelf, Article 1, which states:
For the purpose of these articles, the term ‘Continental Shelf’ is used as 
referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to 
the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 
metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters 
admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; (b) to 
the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of 
islands.
The British Delegation at Geneva had also publicly accepted a scientific 
assessment by UNESCO to the effect that this depression in the bed of the North 
Sea formed part of the continental shelf for legal purposes on account of the 
existence of a sill at its northern end. This view was shared and acted upon by 
Norway, Sweden and Denmark. Indeed since boundary agreements have been
FlG. 1.— Delim itation of the Continental Shelf between the United Kingdom and Norway (1945).
agreed in the area, ignoring the Trough, Norway has successfully exploited the 
region.
Having decided that an equidistance line produced a satisfactory division of 
the continental shelf, a number of technical decisions had to be made, including 
the simplification of the median line, the use of a common datum (European 
datum) and the definition of the lines joining the turning points on the boundary. 
The median line was determined using graphical methods and an accuracy of 
+/- 100 feet was the best that could be achieved. The arc of a great circle was 
used to define the boundary between the turning points. All these factors were 
subsequently used in the later agreements in this area until the advent of compu­
ters in the early seventies, which enabled equidistance lines to be calculated on 
the sphere with great precision.
Whilst the negotiations with Norway were continuing, bilateral talks began 
with the Netherlands on the UK/Dutch continental shelf boundary. As discussed 
earlier, the principles used were the same, and the only new problem to be 
solved, was whether uncompleted harbour works should form part of the baseline. 
In the event, those at Ijmuiden which had been completed, were counted, but the 
proposed extension of Europoort was not. No administrative simplification was 
made and the agreed line remained a true equidistance line. The Agreement [Ref. 
17] was signed on 6 October 1965. However, it was never ratified, as the result 
of a case brought before the International Court of Justice by the Federal Repu­
blic of Germany.
The case brought by the Federal Republic of Germany against the King­
doms of Denmark and the Netherlands, on 20 February 1967, did not directly 
involve the United kingdom’s Territorial Waters Officer, although the court pro­
ceedings and judgement were of the utmost importance and were followed very 
closely. The judgement [Ref. 18] was delivered on 20 February 1969. The Court 
rejected the contention of Denmark and the Netherlands to the effect that the 
delimitations in question had to be carried out in accordance with the principle of 
equidistance as defined in Article 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf [Ref. 12], holding: that the Federal Republic, which had not 
ratified the Convention, was not legally bound by the provisions of Article 6; and 
that the equidistance principle was not a necessary consequence of the general 
concept of continental shelf rights, and was not a rule of customary international 
law. The Court also rejected the contentions of the Federal Republic in so far as 
these sought acceptance of the principle of an apportionment of the continental 
shelf into just and equitable shares. It held that each Party had an origin right to 
these areas of the continental shelf which constituted the natural prolongation of 
its land territory into and under the sea. It was not a question of apportioning or 
sharing out these areas, but of delimiting them. The court found that the boun­
dary lines in question were to be drawn by agreement between the Parties and in 
accordance with equitable principles, and it indicated certain factors to be taken 
into consideration for that purpose. The Parties agreed to negotiate on this basis.
Clearly, whilst this case was being conducted and before the decision was 
reached, which required the parties to delimit their boundaries, the United 
Kingdom could not settle any more of its own North Sea boundaries. However, 
the Territorial Waters Officer was heavily involved in a court case at
home concerning the boundaries in the Thames estuary.
The case, Post Office —v— Estuary Radio Limited, went through the full 
process of United Kingdom law ending in the Appeal Court (Civil Division) [Ref. 
19] in the Summer of 1967. The case was brought against the defendants under 
the Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1949, for broadcasting without a licence from the 
Red Sand Tower in the Thames Estuary, which the Plaintiff considered was in 
United Kingdom international waters. In the event, the case hinged on the 
interpretation of the 1964 Territorial Waters Order in Council [Ref. 14] and the 
use of bay closing lines in Article 4 of the Order. Both Commander B e a z l e y  and 
Commander K e n n e d y  were called as witnesses on behalf of the Plaintiff. Both 
were subjected to long and detailed examination in the witness box and it is to 
their credit, that their clear and undoubted expert evidence on the interpretation of 
the 1964 Order, particularly concerning the natural entrance points to a bay, 
helped to a considerable degree, the successful outcome of the case.
Returning to the North Sea, a very busy period ensued following the 1CJ 
continental shelf case. The Federal Republic of Germany entered into bilateral 
negotiations with both Denmark and the Netherlands and all three countries held 
talks with the United Kingdom. The outcome was three boundary agreements for 
the continental shelf with the Federal Republic of Germany [Ref. 20] (see Fig, 2) 
Denmark [Ref. 21] (see Fig. 3) and a Protocol with the Netherlands [Ref. 22] 
(see Fig. 4) altering the boundary agreed in 1965, These boundaries were ratified 
in 1972.
There then followed a period of intense activity for the Territorial Waters 
Officer lasting for a decade. Talks were already taking place with the French 
concerning the continental shelf boundary in the Channel and the South West 
Approaches. The United Nations had formed a Sea Bed Committee to look into 
the entire subject matter concerning the international regime for the sea bed and 
the ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction following a submission by Malta in 
1967 that the exploration and exploitation of the sea bed beyond national 
jurisdiction should be controlled by an international authority for the benefit of all 
mankind. The Territorial Waters Officer was an important member of the United 
Kingdom Delegation of that Committee. By 1975, bilateral negotiations were 
being conducted with Norway, to complete the UK/Norway continental shelf 
boundary to the UK/Norway/Faeroes tripoint, and with the Republic of Ireland 
concerning our continental shelf boundaries in the Irish Sea, South West 
Approaches and the North West. As Commander B e a z l f y  was spending more 
and more time on the work required for the UN Sea Bed Committee and 
subsequently as a key member of the UK Delegation to the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, it was decided to appoint an Assistant 
Territorial Waters Officer during this period and Lieutenant Commander Richard 
G re e n  duly joined the team until he retired in the early 1980’s.
The talks with France were not progressing well and both sides agreed that 
the delimitation question should be submitted to an ad hoc Court of Arbitration 
and agreement was reached on this procedure in July 1975. The proceedings 
consisted of three sets of written pleadings, followed by oral hearings in Geneva 
in January, February and May 1977, all of which required a considerable input
FlG. 2 .—  Delim itation of the Continental Shelf between the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germ any (1972 ).
FlG. 3 .— Delim itation of the Continental Shelf between the United K ingdom  and Denmark (1972).
Fig. 4.— Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the United Kingdom and the Netherlands
(1972).
from the Territorial Waters Officer. The Court’s decision was delivered in July 
1977 [Ref. 23] (see Fig. 5). The Court delimited the continental shelf in the 
Channel by a median line giving full effect for all islands, including the Eddystone, 
which the French had accepted for fisheries purposes, in the South West Approa­
ches, a median line giving half effect to the Scilly Islands; and in the area to the 
north and north west of the Channel Islands, a 12-nm enclave boundary. The 
Court declared that it was not competent under the Arbitration Agreement to 
delimit the boundary in the narrow belt east and south of the Channel Islands, 
where questions affecting the territorial sea were involved. The United Kingdom 
was not happy on two technical points concerning the boundary to the north of 
the Channel Islands, which showed some discrepancies in the basepoints used, 
and the line in the South West Approaches, which the UK contended should 
have been a geodesic and not a loxodrome as drawn. Further oral hearings were 
heard in 1978 and the final decision was delivered in March of that year, 
upholding the United Kingdom’s query on the Channel Islands, but rejecting the 
request for a change in the South West. This was not a unanimous decision.
Meanwhile the bilateral talks with Norway were progressing apace. The 
boundary was calculated on the same parameters as had been used in 1965, but 
was computed rather than derived graphically and a difference of 331 metres was 
found between the northern limit of the 1965 agreement and the computed posi­
tion of the same point. This caused much discussion and resulted in a linking line 
331 metres in length along the parallel 61°44'12".00 N joining the two boundary 
lines. The Protocol supplementary to the Agreement of 1965 was signed in 
December 1978 [Ref. 24] (see Fig. 6).
The negotiations with the Irish Republic had produced no agreement on 
boundaries and it was agreed by both sides that the dispute should go to arbitra­
tion in 1976. The difficulties were numerous. The topic of delimitation was under 
discussion in the LOS Conference where opposed positions were adopted. The 
British position was that a true median line should stand as a starting point and 
that all designated areas to date, including the 1974 designation to the west of 
Rockall, should stand. The Irish contended that islands further than three nautical 
miles from the mainland coast should have no effect. Talks on the setting up of a 
Court of Arbitration continued through 1976 and intermittently thereafter. Interna­
tional law on delimitation issues was especially unsettled during this period and it 
was felt by both sides that the developments in the United Nations Law of the 
Sea Conference, together with the UK/France Arbitration, should run their course 
before further efforts were made to reach agreement on simplifying the arguments 
to be arbitrated.
Following the UK/France Arbitration, talks very rapidly began on the 
remaining UK/France continental shelf boundary to the east of 0°30' W  towards 
the UK/France/Belgium tripoint. The French agreed at a very early stage to 
accept United Kingdom basepoints as if we already had a 12-nm territorial sea 
and were happy that we should use basepoints on the Goodwin Sands. Technical 
data was exchanged in 1979 and a simplified median line, agreed entirely by 
correspondence, was achieved by early 1982. The Agreement was signed in June 
1982 [Ref. 25] (see Fig. 7). This Agreement does not go as far as the UK/ 
















































FlG. 6 .—  D e lim ita t io n  of the C o n tin e n ta l She lf betw een the  U n ited  K in g do m  and  N orw ay
(1978).
FlG. 7 .— Delim itation of the Continental Shelf between the United K ingdom  and France ( 1982).
The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea [Ref. 26] finally 
concluded following the final session in Montego Bay in December 1982 with the 
Convention opened for signature. Although the United Kingdom felt unable to 
sign it, I think it is fair to say that the United Kingdom Delegation played an 
important role in the shape and content of parts of the final document and Peter 
B e a z l e y  can be justly proud of his own contribution, especially on Part II (Terri­
torial Sea).
PRESENT DAY
Following the completion of UNCLOS, both Peter B e a z l e y  and Richard 
G r e e n  retired fairly closely to each other, the latter without relief. Commander 
Bob H a l l id a y  held the post for two years until 1985 followed briefly by Com­
mander Mike B a r r it t  before the author took up the appointment in 1986. At 
that time, two questions were of immediate importance: the extension of the 
United Kingdom’s territorial waters from 3 nm to 12 nm and the continental 
boundary with the Republic of Ireland.
The extension to 12 nm had been discussed for many years, but had been 
resisted by the United Kingdom on the grounds of perceived difficulties in the 
freedoms of navigation and overflight through straits used for international navi­
gation. By the early 1980’s State practice based on the outcome of the Confe­
rence was deemed to have made the 12-nm territorial seas limit customary inter­
national law and the United Kingdom no longer protested at such action. 
However, the problems associated with straits passage were still present. The 
desirability to extend to 12 nm was finally brought to a head once the Channel 
Tunnel project had been approved. France had territorial sea jurisdiction in the 
Dover Strait to the UK/France continental shelf boundary, but the United 
Kingdom had only a 3-nm limit and only continental shelf jurisdiction beyond that 
to the boundary. In 1987, the British Government introduced into Parliament 
proposals to extend the territorial sea to 12 nm subject to a boundary with 
France in the Dover Strait. When introducing the Bill in the House of Lords, the 
Minister of State issued the following statement:
‘... it has been recognised in State practice, international negotiations and 
the case law of the International Court that a special regime for navigation 
is appropriate in straits.
International law and practice have now developed to the point 
where, if the United Kingdom extends to 12 miles, we should afford to 
others the essential rights in some internationally important straits for which 
there is no alternative route; namely the Straits of Dover, the North 
Channel lying between Scotland and Northern Ireland, and the passage 
between Shetland and Orkney. These rights, which are widely recognised 
as necessary, include: a right of unimpeded passage through such straits 
for merchant vessels and warships; a right of overflight; the right of sub­
marines to pass through the straits submerged; and appropriate safeguards 
for the security and other interests of the coastal State.
In other straits used for international navigation, such as the Pent- 
land Firth south of Orkney and the passage between the Scilly Isles and 
the mainland of Cornwall, as in other parts of the territorial sea, a right of 
innocent passage will continue to exist in accordance with the practice of 
States.’ [Ref. 27].
The Bill was duly passed and the Territorial Sea Act 1987 [Ref. 28] came 
into force on 1 October of that year.
Once the United Kingdom had extended her territorial sea limits to 12 nm, 
a revised boundary agreement was required in the Straits of Dover from, what 
had previously been a territorial sea/continental shelf boundary between France 
and the United Kingdom, into a pure territorial sea boundary between the two 
countries. Negotiations began in 1988, in what was basically a technical matter 
to decide on the two end points of this boundary as the boundary already in 
place was not to be altered. Negotiations were straight forward and the new 
Agreement was duly signed on 2 November 1988 and came into force on 6 
April 1989 [Ref. 29]. Of more significance was the joint declaration by the two 
countries concerning the right of transit passage through the Straits. The terms of 
the Declaration were as follows:
‘On the occasion of the signature of the Agreement relating to the 
Delimitation of the territorial sea in the Straits of Dover, the two Govern­
ments agreed on the following declaration:
The existence of a specific regime of navigation in straits is generally 
accepted in the current state of international law. The need for such a 
regime is particularly clear in straits, such as the Straits of Dover, used for 
international navigation and linking two parts of the high seas or economic 
zones in the absence of any other route of similar convenience with respect 
to navigation.
In consequence, the two Governments recognise rights of unimpeded 
transit passage for merchant vessels, state vessels, in particular, warships 
following their normal mode of navigation, as well as the right of overflight 
or aircraft, in the Straits of Dover. It is understood that, in accordance 
with the principles governing this regime under the rules of international 
law, such passage will be exercised in a continuous and expeditious 
manner. The two Governments will continue to co-operate closely, both 
bilaterally and through the International Maritime Organisation in the 
interests of ensuring the safety of navigation in the Straits of Dover, as 
well as in the southern North Sea and the Channel. In particular, the 
traffic separation scheme in the Straits of Dover will not be affected by the 
entry into force of the Agreement. With due regard to the interests of the 
coastal States, the two Governments will also take, in accordance with 
international agreements in force and generally accepted rules and regula­
tions, measures necessary in order to prevent, reduce and contain pollution 
of the marine environment by vessels.
David A n d er so n , Deputy Legal Adviser at the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, expanded on this theme in his excellent paper ‘The Right of Transit 
Passage and the Straits of Dover’, presented to a' conference on 30 March- 
1 April 1989 at the Centre for Oceans Law and Policy in Washington.
Meanwhile on the continental boundaries front, the stalled talks between the 
United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland began again in earnest in the spring 
of 1986. Both sides began by reviewing their positions as they had been ten 
years earlier in the light of State practice, the outcome of the United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea and the various International Court cases that 
had occurred during the intervening period. One factor was immediately apparent, 
neither side could hope to sustain its previous position in the light of developments 
in International Law and State practice. Going to arbitration was still an option, 
but concern was expressed both about the probable cost of such action and the 
fear that the court would not be prepared to delimit a line, when third parties 
could be involved. This point was prompted by the judgement in the Malta/Lybia 
case [Ref. 30]. It was considered that the best way forward would be an attempt 
to negotiate a bilateral agreement (or possibly a partial agreement) keeping arbi­
tration as the ultimate fall back position. The area to be delimited naturally falls 
into three sections, the Irish Sea, South West Approaches and the North West 
and they were tackled in that order, but as part of an overall settlement.
Meetings took place alternately between London and Dublin approximately 
every six weeks for two and a half years. It was agreed at a very early stage 
that Admiralty charts would be used by both sides during the negotiations. These 
were supplemented from time to time by specially prepared computer drawn maps 
by both Departments of Energy. It was also agreed fairly early on that the 
boundary would be stepped, complementing the designated area blocks of both 
countries. Towards the end of the negotiations it was decided to refer the final 
boundary to World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS 84) reflecting a growing desire 
by the oil industry for reference to a modern world wide datum. I think it is fair 
to say that at some stage, during these long and complex negotiations, every 
method or device that has been used in delimitations and some that have not, 
were discussed and studied at length. A substantial percentage of the author’s 
work as the Territorial Waters Officer was dedicated to this task for the entire 
period of the negotiations. However, the time spent on this task was rewarded 
with a successful Agreement signed in Dublin on 7 November 1988 [Ref. 31] 
(see Figs. 8 and 9). It is expected that the Agreement will be ratified by the two 
Governments in the near future.
This Agreement is the one of the longest continental shelf boundary delimi­
tation to date. The boundary through the Irish Sea into the south west 
Approaches is some 502 nm in length and in the North West 634 nm, a total of 
approximately 1,136 nautical miles. It will allow both countries to extend their 
designated areas and enable the oil industries on both sides opportunities to 
exploit new acreage.
Once this Agreement has been ratified a large proportion of the United 
Kingdom’s continental shelf will have been delimited as shown on Figure 10. As 
can be seen the only outstanding continental boundaries to be agreed are those 
with Belgium, which should pose few problems once they have agreed their lateral 
boundary with France; Denmark (Faeroes), which is the longest remaining line to 
be settled; Iceland, a relatively short boundary all in deep water; and France, a 
tidying up operation in the Southern North Sea to the UK/France/Belgium tri­
point, and a slightly longer boundary in the south west Approaches beyond the 




























































































































































































jurisdiction. Clearly the area to the north is potentially the most difficult, with 
large counter-claims covering huge expanses of ocean. However following the 
UK/Republic of Ireland agreement the author is optimistic that the remainder will 
follow in due course.
Territorial sea boundaries still have to be delimited between the Channel 
Islands and France and between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, the 
latter involving other issues outside the realm of delimitation.
Apart from delimitation and boundary problems, the task of the Territorial 
Waters Officer is both varied and rewarding. The author advise the Ministry of 
Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and other Government Departments 
on a wide range of issues concerning the limits of sovereignty over, and laws 
relating to, territorial waters, economic zones, pollution zones, fishery zones, 
continental shelves and the high seas throughout the world. The Territorial 
Waters Officer is tasked to ensure that information published by the Hydro­
grapher on charts, sailing directions, etc. is correct and where applicable is 
supported by legislation. He is required to keep the master copy of the United 
Kingdom’s base-line co-ordinates controlling a 3-nm Territorial Sea and Fishery 
Limit and 200-nm Fishery Limit. Up to date lists are also maintained for all bay 
closing lines and harbour limits. Any changes to the base points, which affect the 
published limits, have to be promulgated, normally by Notices to Mariners.
Requests for selected details of the baseline come from a variety of sources, 
not least HM Customs and Excise. The TWO is regularly called as an expert 
witness for the Crown in court cases, where the position of the baseline and the 
maritime zones measured from it, are in doubt.
The TWO is also required to keep a watching-brief on the legality of 
proposed restrictions to navigation in UK waters such as: prohibited anchorage 
and fishing areas, safety zones around offshore structures, offshore development 
areas and marine nature reserves.
Foreign maritime claims and restrictions are also analyzed and advice for­
ward on possible diplomatic action.
Apart from the United Kingdom, the same tasks are performed for the 
remaining Dependent Territories. Territorial sea issues are currently the most 
active area, with Bermuda already having a territorial sea limit of 12 nautical 
miles [Ref. 32]. The question of extension for some other Dependent Territories is 
under consideration.
Boundary delimitation around the Dependent Territories is in its infancy. 
The only agreement to date concerns the economic zone around the French 
Tuamotin Archipelago and the fisheries zone around the United Kingdom Depen­
dent Territories in the Pitcairn Islands [Ref. 33], This boundary is based on equi­
distance between equally small islands on both sides. Many territorial sea and 
continental shelf boundaries have still to be delimited as illustrated in Limits in the 
Seas No. 108 [Ref. 34],
CONCLUSION
The role of the Territorial Waters Officer has fundamentally remained un­
changed since its inception 72 years ago. However, the scope of the task has 
expanded in line with the developments in the law of the sea, although the geo­
graphical responsibilities have reduced with the demise of the British Empire.
Advances in the delimitation of maritime boundaries have posed the 
greatest challenge from pure equidistance principles derived by graphic skills, to 
computer derived equidistance lines, still considered a legitimate starting point for 
most boundary negotiations. Added to these skills, basic knowledge of many 
more disciplines is now required, including international maritime law, state 
practice, geophysics, geology, geography, etc. All these subjects and more can be 
used in the determination of a maritime boundary to achieve an equitable result. 
The work of the Territorial Waters Officer will pose a fascinating challenge for 
many years to come.
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